An enterprise information portal (EIP) is viewed as a knowledge community. Activity theory provides a framework to study such a community: members of an EIP conduct specific tasks that are assigned through a division of labor. Each member of an enterprise information portal can undergo three distinct types of learning processes: learning-by-investment, learning-by-doing, and learning-from-others. Through these three types of learning processes, each member achieves specialized knowledge that is related to his or her own task. Cumulative knowledge resulting from the learning processes is considered in terms of two distinct attributes: depth and breadth of knowledge. This paper formulates a mathematical model and defines the goal of an EIP member as maximizing the net benefits of knowledge resulting from individual investment and effort. Numerical examples are provided to analyze patterns of optimal investment and effort plans as well as the resulting accumulated knowledge. The results provide useful managerial implications. In business conditions characterized by high interest rates or high internal rate of returns, it is preferable for members to delay spending their resources for learning. Intensive investment and efforts to obtain knowledge are preferable when the discount rate of costs is high, when knowledge is durable, when the value of knowledge is high, when the initial level of knowledge is high, when the productivity of the learning process is high, and when sufficient knowledge is transferred from other members. On the other hand, the size of the EIP has a positive or negative effect depending on the attribute of knowledge and the productivity of teaming processes. Further properties of the optimal decisions and learning processes are analyzed and discussed.
This paper develops a perspective to modeling team processes by drawing on concepts from team theory, and the informational processing and organizational paradigms. In such a perspective, humans and their interactions in a team are modeled as objects in a computerized environment. The behavior of the objects are specified in terms of the executable programs. A simulation testbed is described. Various information structures for team decision making in an example financial domain are examined. Questions regarding the relationship between information structure (who (knows) what, when, and how (the information is used)) and team performance are studied for the example. Thus this study can be seen as a step in the translation of behavioral and normative viewpoints of team decision making into a computational framework. The results indicate that there are complex relationships between information structure and team performance. The conventional wisdom relating improved performance to more information is not always true. The experiments demonstrate several situations of team interaction where more information can lead to dysfunctional effects.
Outsourcing is the contracting of various information systems' sub- functions by user firms to outside information systems vendors. A critical factor in the outsourcing process is the bidding and vendor selection mechanism. This paper describes the process of outsourcing and identifies the various stages involved. Subsequently, considering that cost reduction is a driving force of outsourcing for user-firms, this paper proposes a bidding mechanism to reduce expected outsourcing costs in the final bidding and vendor selection process. The paper studies outsourcing contracts of routine and repetitive activities such as maintenance and operation of telecommunication networks. A realistic scenario is studied, wherein multiple vendors bid for such contracts and where one vendor has cost and expertise advantages over other vendors and as a result tends to inflate bids. A mixed integer programming model is formulated for a multiple vendor scenario. In general, the results suggest a prescription that calls for the use of "carrot and stick" policies by the user firm. Subsidies (the carrot) need to be used as incentives for bidders to announce their most competitive bids. In addition, penalties (the stick) have to be levied in order to pressure bidders not to bid high.